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MacColl’s elusive pluralism
John Woods
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
& King’s College, London, UK
Résumé : MacColl a été récemment l’objet de trois intéressantes thèses.
D’abord, il serait le probable père du pluralisme en logique. Ensuite, son
pluralisme porterait un instrumentalisme sous-jacent. Enfin, les deux thèses
précédentes expliqueraient l’oubli dans lequel il serait tombé après 1909. Bien
qu’il soit à la fois pluraliste et instrumentaliste à certains égards, je suggèrerai
qu’il est difficile de trouver dans les écrits de MacColl un pluralisme qui puisse
satisfaire les trois thèses précédentes en apparaissant pour la première fois
chez MacColl, en trouvant ses sources dans un instrumentalisme adapté à la
logique, et en étant l’explication à l’oubli dans lequel était tombé son auteur.
Abstract: MacColl is the recent subject of three interesting theses. One is
that he is the probable originator of pluralism in logic. The other is that his
pluralism expresses an underlying instrumentalism. The third is that the first
two help explain his post-1909 neglect. Although there are respects in which
he is both a pluralist and an instrumentalist, I will suggest that it is difficult to
find in MacColl’s writings a pluralism which honours the threefold attribution
of having been originated by him, having been rooted in an instrumentalism
adapted to logic, and being the occasion of his neglect.
The writer of this paper would like to contribute his humble share
as a peacemaker between the two sciences, both of which he pro-
foundly respects and admires. He would like to deprecate all idea
of aggression or conquest. [. . . ] Why should not logicians and
mathematicians unite [. . . ] under some common appellation?
[MacColl 1880, 47]
In Logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build his
own logic, i.e., his own form of language, as he wishes.
[Carnap 1937, 52]
We are pluralists about logical consequence. [. . . ] We hold that
there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deduc-
tively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally de-
serving of the name deductive validity.
[Beall & Restall 2001, 1]
Philosophia Scientiæ, 15 (1), 2011, 205–234.
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The birth of pluralism?
In their authoritative “Hugh MacColl and the birth of logical pluralism”,
Shahid Rahman and Juan Redmond observe that “MacColl’s philosophy is
a kind of instrumentalism in logic which led him to set the basis of what
might be considered to be the first pluralism in logic” [Rahman & Redmond
2008, 539–540], thus echoing a suggestion of Ivor Grattan-Guinness to the
same effect [Grattan-Guinness 1998]. 1 Pluralism has become a hot-button
issue in the philosophy of logic. Not only was it the official theme of a
meeting not too long ago of the Society for Exact Philosophy 2 and of the
Tartu Conference in 2008, 3 but approving monographs now flow from the
best university presses [Beall & Restall 2006]. If there were a better time
than now to reflect on MacColl’s importance for logical pluralism, I would be
hard-pressed to name it.
Seen Rahman and Redmond (henceforth: R & R)’s way, MacColl’s plu-
ralism embeds a philosophical component and a linguistic component. The
philosophical component is logical instrumentalism. Instrumentation also has
two parts. On the one hand, it is a goal-sensitive doctrine according to which
the tenability of a system of logic is a matter of how well it produces the out-
comes for which it was designed. On the other hand, there are different yet
equally legitimate purposes which a logic can be made to subserve.
The linguistic part of MacColl’s pluralism is captured by the idea that
a logic’s formalism will contain classes of expressions bearing variable inter-
pretations that facilitate the realization of logic’s shifting goals. Thus we
read that:
there is nothing sacred or eternal about symbols; [. . . ] all symbolic
conventions may be altered when convenience requires it, in order
to adapt them to new conditions or to new classes of problems.
[MacColl 1906, 1]
With MacColl we have one of those occasions with which intellectual history
is littered. In his life-time, MacColl’s work was known to most of the major
logicians of his day, with a number of whom he had a profitable correspon-
dence. But with his death in 1909, recognition of the importance—indeed
of the fact—of his writings ceased. What explains this regrettable collapse,
this consignment to oblivion? R & R offer two suggestions. One is that since
MacColl lacked the technical tools that lifted early twentieth century math-
ematical logic to its first maturity, he was unable to make good on many of
1. I. Grattan-Guinness now recants MacColl’s pluralism, as witness his contribu-
tion to this volume.
2. See the proceedings of the meeting published as [Woods & Brown 2001]. See
in particular four of its chapters: [Beall & Restall 2001], [Priest 2001], [Woods 2001],
and [Sher 2001].
3. Conference on Logical pluralism, University of Tartu, August 27-31, 2008, with
a bevy of notables, ranging from Beall to Westerståhl. Papers from the conference
are now starting to appear in print. See, for example, [Field 2009].
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his most important insights. The other is that he “was probably the first to
explicitly extend conventionalism and instrumentalism to logic” [Rahman &
Redmond 2008, 534], which, they say, is “the basis of what might be consid-
ered to be the first pluralism in logic” [Rahman & Redmond 2008, 539–540].
And they add: “Unfortunately most of [MacColl’s] ideas were not developed
thoroughly and many others remained in a state which makes them difficult
to grasp” [Rahman & Redmond 2008, 540]. Accordingly, we have from R & R
three interesting claims to keep an eye on.
THE PLURALISM THESIS: MacColl is the probable originator
of pluralism in logic.
THE INSTRUMENTALIST THESIS: This pluralism is embedded
in and is an expression of MacColl’s adaptation of instrumental-
ism to logical theory.
THE NEGLECT THESIS: MacColl’s neglect by the post-1909
waves of modern symbolic logic, even the branches to which he
made pioneering contributions, is explained, in part at least, by
this instrumentalism and the pluralism which inheres in it.
These observations of R & R’s provide me with the wherewithal to box my own
compass and to chart my own course. This is the course of interpretation and
assessment. I want to know how to understand the Rahman and Redmond-
theses (henceforth: RR-theses) and I want to know whether they are true.
It will not be clear sailing. Trouble threatens, partly MacColl’s doing and
partly R & R’s. The first difficulty is occasioned by the fragmentary and ill-
explained state of MacColl’s own pronouncements. The other flows from the
fact that MacColl’s pluralism and instrumentalism are not self-ascribed but
rather are attributed by R & R. They say that MacColl originates our concept
of pluralism and instantiates our concept of instrumentalism.
There is a further challenge to be quickly considered. It arises from the
so-called (and misnamed) principle of charity [Scriven 1976]. Charity bids me
to interpret the RR-theses in ways that give them a fair shot at being true.
But the RR-theses are claims about MacColl. Charity also requires that we
read MacColl in ways that give his views a fair shot of being true. Where,
then, does my first duty lie? Must I read MacColl with a view to making
MacColl right or with a view to making R & R right? Let it not be supposed
that these are always the same readings. For if that were the case, the only
ways in which it would be permissible to read MacColl would be ways that
give pluralism and instrumentalism themselves a fair chance of being true. But
that’s too much front-loading for serious consideration here. What I want to
know is not whether MacColl’s views are correct, but rather whether R & R’s
characterizations of them are correct. This tells us something interesting about
the charity principle. It triggers a tension when pairs of texts or parties are
involved, with the one interpreting the other. 4
4. Of course, one of the main challenges to the charity principle is determining
how much slack to cut in order to give an utterance or text a fair shot at coming
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Modus operandi
Here is how I propose to proceed. I will try to determine whether there
are versions of present-day pluralism and instrumentalism which offer some
promise of confirming the appropriately adjusted RR-claims. That is, I want to
see whether there is a modern pluralism shaped by a modern instrumentalism
which would have been neglected by the very people (whoever they turn out to
be; see below) who, according to the Neglect Thesis, were the actual neglectors
of MacColl’s own instrumentally shaped pluralism. I will then try to determine
whether grounds exist for attributing that pluralism and that instrumentalism
to MacColl.
I don’t want to minimize the difficulties that lie ahead. Our pluralism
and our instrumentalism are not “free on board”. They are themselves un-
ruly families of not always compatible views, ranging in interest, plausibility
and complexity from not very to very very. There are more ways of being
a pluralist about logic, and an instrumentalist too, than I have space for
here. I want, if I can, to subdue some of this abundance by operating at
levels of abstraction consistent with the achievement of the paper’s goals.
The pluralistic and instrumentalistic themes that I will sound in the com-
ing sections will be discernible for the most part to anyone familiar with the
20th century developments in logic. So, to the extent possible, I will flesh
them out with a minimum of specific attribution. While the principal focus
is present-day pluralism, at various places I will cut to MacColl, or segue
to instrumentalism, when doing so will assist in testing the RR-claims. A
slightly more stand-alone discussion of instrumentalism will occupy us in the
“Instrumentalism” section below.
In the next section I’ll be mainly concerned with house-cleaning. I want to
sweep away some of the forms of pluralism which, while not devoid of interest,
are not of much moment for present purposes. For recall, we are searching for
a pluralism that MacColl invented and which expresses—or is shaped by—an
instrumentalism of a kind that would explain its author’s neglect.
Many-one pluralism
MacColl’s contributions to logic are striking. He is an original and protean
thinker, multi-tasking outside the box and beyond the reach of his technical
powers. His pioneering work ranges far and wide, and his writings anticipate
some of the most important developments in the work that was yet to come.
In his writings we have the modal systems of strict implication, we have many-
valued logic, relevant logic, and connexive logic, and we have probability logic.
In one sense, this is already a kind of pluralism—one that answers Graham
out true. There isn’t time for that here. For a recent discussion of how the charity
principle does not work, see [Paglieri & Woods 2009].
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Priest’s question, “Logic: one or many?” with “Many” [Priest 2001] . MacColl
as we might say, is a many-one pluralist. Less clear is whether this is the
pluralism intended by the passage on the alteration of symbolic conventions,
quoted above from MacColl’s Symbolic Logic. Less clear than that is the reality
of the connection to instrumentalism. Less clear still is the purported bearing
on MacColl’s neglect.
Consider a case. There is a well-known dispute in logical theory as to when
a formalism achieves the status of logic. For most of his philosophical career,
Quine was of the view that nothing is a system of logic beyond first-order
quantification theory with identity [Quine 1970]. 5 Accordingly, the S systems
of modal “logic” might be linguistic or philosophical theories of necessity, but
they are not logics; and the FDE family of relevant “logics” might be theories of
inference or belief revision but they aren’t logics either. 6 The divide between
classical and non-classical logics is often marked by a dispute about which
classes of expressions qualify as logical particles. 7 This in turn gives rise to
a certain kind of pluralist/unitarian tension. If we hold with Quine that only
the usual logical particles 8 under their classical interpretations are genuinely
logical terms, then we are logical-term unitarians. But if we find against Quine,
if we allow that the alethic modal ‘◻’ and the epistemic modal ‘K’ are also
logical particles or that ‘∼’, ‘∧, ‘∨’, ‘⊃’ and ‘≡ ’ non-classically interpreted also
qualify, then we are logical-term pluralists.
Does being a unitarian about logic require that we reject instrumental-
ism? Does it require that we eschew the idea that “symbolic connections may
be altered . . . in order to adapt them to new conditions or to new classes
of problems”? Quine’s unitarianism is a substantial discouragement of these
suggestions. Quine’s unitarianism arises from the thesis that there is just one
task for logic legitimately to perform, namely, to provide a philosophically
coherent accommodation of the language of science. If logic had other good
purposes—such as the formal analysis of necessity—then Quine’s instrumen-
talism would have bade him to get on with it. Quine’s unitarianism flows not
from an anti-instrumentalism but rather from the philosophical conviction that
there is nothing in what logic is needed for beyond the provisions of first-order
quantification theory. Similarly, Quine’s concomitant pledge to the canonicity
of first-order formalisms counts for nothing against the point that formalisms
5. Let’s be careful. Quine’s views on logic allow for this possibility. But his
philosophical views are not much at ease with it. On the other hand, the present
position is explicitly held by Harman [Harman 1972].
6. For different versions of the view that implication and inference require differ-
ent treatments, see [Woods 1968], [Woods & Walton 1972], [Harman 1986, chap. 1],
[Apostoli & Brown 1995] and [Brown 2002].
7. Concerning which, even among the classically-minded, there is a notable defi-
nitional uncertainty. See [Tarski 1956], [Peacocke 1976], [Hacking 1979] and [Gabbay
1994].
8. Or some one of them to which the others are reducible by way of the functional
completeness metatheorem.
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can be adjusted when the conditions warrant it. It proceeds rather from the
philosophical conviction that, as it happens, conditions don’t warrant it. 9
What now of the suggestion that MacColl is the (probable) originator of
pluralism in logic? As we see, there is a perfectly good sense of pluralism,
which MacColl’s work certainly instantiates, for which the originality thesis
won’t hold up. In this sense, Aristotle himself was logic’s first pluralist, what
with his non-modal syllogistic, his logic of immediate implication 10 and his
modal syllogistic. Accordingly,
NOT ORIGINAL: There is a sense of pluralism in logic—the
many-one sense—according to which it is possible to be an in-
strumentalist without being a pluralist, and for which the thesis of
a MacCollian nativity fails.
This leaves the reverse question. Can you be a many-one pluralist without be-
ing an instrumentalist? One wonders. Take Aristotle again. Aristotle would
say that adjusting one’s notation in ways that facilitate an analysis of necessity
is a legitimate and necessary thing for a logician to do. 11 The goodness or bad-
ness of modalizing the language of the syllogistic is to be judged by the extent
to which the modal analysis actually comes off or at least is achievable in prin-
ciple. 12 If this is what instrumentalism is, then Aristotle is an instrumentalist.
If this is what instrumentalism is, then even realists are instrumentalists, and
we have an answer to our second question:
NOT MACCOLL’S: The present sense of instrumentalism is not
the instrumentalism which scholars think is peculiar to MacColl.
Of course, it is trivial that for instrumentalism in this sense the Neglect Thesis
also fails.
MacColl’s own words suggest an attraction to the following view: Anything
that facilitates the attainment of a good end without falling foul of some suf-
ficiently bad end inherits the good end’s goodness. More briefly, the goodness
of ends is imbibed by their means. This is hardly instrumentalism in any
sense seriously deserving of the name. But let’s cut it some slack and give it
the name of means-end instrumentalism. Means-end instrumentalism stands
to philosophically robust instrumentalism as white chocolate stands to choco-
late. Accordingly, although MacColl is a many-one pluralist and a means-end
instrumentalist, neither of these positions originates with him, and neither is
a plausible basis for his neglect. This leaves us some further work to do, not
9. Of course, this is what we might call vintage Quine. Late in his career, he
softened his resistance to intuitionistic logic and abandoned it altogether for quantum
logic, albeit with regret [Quine 1992].
10. Misleadingly called immediate inference.
11. For example, Aristotle insisted that syllogisms be built of propositions only—or
what we would call categorical propositions, that is, statements of the A, I, E, O
forms.
12. Or, perhaps, initiates a research programme that ultimately succeeds.
MacColl’s elusive pluralism 211
least concerning the sense in which MacColl really was an instrumentalist—
that is, a philosophically robust one. I want, as I say, to postpone the more
important parts of the discussion of the instrumentalism question until later.
For the present, let me call a brief time-out for a few words about formalisms.
There is nothing especially exotic about the observation that logics with
different vocabularies can be put to quite different uses—think here of the lan-
guage of classical first-order logic and the language of (say) KT45. 13 Neither
is there much of interest in the claim that a symbol of one language could also
be given the interpretation customarily possessed by a different symbol of a
different language—think here of the decision to give to the box symbol ‘◻’
of S5 the interpretation standardly possessed by the ‘K’ symbol of the KT45
adaptation of it. Regarding the first of these claims, we could say that different
logical symbols can express different concepts. Regarding the second claim,
we could say that a given logical symbol can be given different interpretations
which express different concepts. Thus in the first instance, ‘◻’ expresses the
necessity operator and ‘K’ the knowledge operator; and in the second, ‘◻’,
which carries the standard interpretation of necessity, is given the customary
interpretation of ‘K’ as a non-standard interpretation. This is not yet all there
is to MacColl’s pluralism—not anywhere close.
So we sum up. Many-one pluralism is as interesting as the unitarianism it
rejects and the logics to which it extends its hospitality. But it bears repeating
that in the present context it is hardly interesting at all. For as we see, there
is nothing original about MacColl’s many-one pluralism and nothing in it that
requires an instrumentalist foundation; and so nothing that would induce its
neglect on that basis.
Multiplicities
The founding datum for the more interesting pluralisms of present-day
logic is multiplicity. There are, as the saying has it, more logics than you can
shake a stick at. It is an unruly plenitude—crowded, chaotic and conflicted. 14
It is a discipline excited into cellular excess by a misbehaving auto-immune
system. It is a turbulence that over-runs its own quality controls.
The pluralisms I now want to discuss embed a strategy for saving face.
In its most general form, it is a strategy which sanctions modern logic’s mul-
tiplicities while dissipating the bad odour they exude. It is a proposal to
make of logic’s ceaseless pullulations a teeming prosperity, 15 une richesse sans
l’embarras. The two most problematic features of logic’s multiplicity are in-
13. KT45 is an epistemic adaptation of S5. See, for example [Auman 1976].
14. For a classification of this multiplicity, and the suggestion that instrumentalism
is not implied by pluralism, see [Haack 1978].
15. To borrow Quine’s words about quite another thing. (Of course!)
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compatibility and blindness. 16 The problem with incompatibility is falsity.
For every cluster of pairwise incompatible logics, at least half are false. The
problem with blindness is want of subject matter, the absence of something
to be about. There are two ways of annulling these difficulties, each a form of
denial. In its first form, which I’ll call “existential denial”, it is the claim that
these logics aren’t in fact in conflict with one another and aren’t in fact blind.
In its second form, which I’ll call “even-so denial”, the incompatibilities and
the blindness are acknowledged, but their offensiveness is not. Seen the first
way, the properties are bad but not present. Seen the second way, they are
present but not bad. Of these two forms, existential denial has a much larger
provenance in the literature. Since time presses, I shall confine myself to it,
reserving even-so denial for another occasion.
Consider now a very simple case. M is a family of propositional modal
logics spanning the period from 1918 to 1951. They are the eight strict impli-
cation logics of Lewis, S1 to S8, Brouwer’s system B, Gödel’s basic system G,
Feys’ system T , and von Wright’s system M . What makes M an interesting
cluster is that it has a structure, as in the figure below, 17 which attracts some
typical pluralist responses.
B
A
Gödel’s Basic System
Fey’s System
Von Wright’s M
Brouwer’s System
S1 S2 S3
S6 S7 S8
S5S4
The arrows and dotted lines have the following significance:
1. Ð→ expresses containment.
2. Systems above line A have the Gödel rule RL (if ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ ◻ϕ).
3. Systems below line A don’t have RL.
4. Systems below line B have ⊢ ◊◊ϕ.
5. Systems above line B don’t have ⊢ ◊◊ϕ .
6. Systems above line A are incompatible with ⊢ ◊◊ϕ .
7. Systems below line B are incompatible with RL.
16. These are not only different problems, but it is not easy to see how a cluster
of logics could be aﬄicted by them concurrently. See below, the “The vernacular”
section.
17. Which I adapt from [Follesdal 2004].
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Perhaps M isn’t much of a multiplicity. It is not nearly as big as the
chart—let’s call it M′—of normal logics in [Hughes & Cresswell 1968, 346],
and the even larger chartM′′ in [Hughes & Cresswell 1996, 18]. But evenM’s
comparatively modest multiplicity is enough to stir the pulse of pluralism. To
see how, let me begin with a brief word about blindness. There are several
logics in this cluster. This alone is offensive to unitarian leanings. There
aren’t, we might think, enough different things for these different logics to be
logics of. It is a Kantian complaint: Theories without subject matters are
blind. What, then, are we to do to restore to M the desired respectability?
Subconcept pluralism
Talk of subject matters in logic is loose talk. We should try to tighten
up. Perhaps concepts are the way to go. It is widely agreed that the central
target for logic is the concept of consequence. It is also generally supposed
that when a logic’s analysis of implication proceeds by way of its provisions
for the logical particles, then their denotata are also targets for analysis. One
way of specifying the subject matter of a logic is to equate it with its target
concepts. In the case of the members ofM, their subject matter is implication,
possibility and, say, negation and conjunction. 18
Thinking of subject matters in this way solves the blindness problem for
M. But it does so in a way that appears to land us in the incompatibility
problem. Consider, for example, S5 and S2. While it may be true that they
have this same subject matter, isn’t it problematic that concerning ◊◊ϕ they
make incompatible provision for it?
One way of reconciling difference of treatment to sameness of subject mat-
ter, and of doing so in a way that solves M’s incompatibility problem, is to
identify the sameness with a common generic concept and the differences with
different specific subconcepts of it. Accordingly, the concept of implication
would stand to its subconcepts in M as genus stands to species.
The distinction between generic concepts and their specific concepts helps
us see the compatibility between
GENERIC UNITARIANISM: A class of logics is generically uni-
tarian to the extent that they have the same generic target con-
cepts.
and
18. There is currently a good deal of philosophical turbulence about concepts—
stretching from the sceptical view that there aren’t any (or its slighter version that
no philosophical good could be got from them if there were any) to the more generous
view according to which the problem isn’t that there aren’t any concepts but rather
that philosophers haven’t yet come close to getting at the philosophical good that is
in them. Concerning the first of these positions, see for example [Machery 2009] and,
concerning the second, [Margolis & Laurence 1996]. I have considerable respect for
the problems thrown up by an ontology of concepts. But unless I am much mistaken,
my invocation of them here will not require the disarming of those difficulties.
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SPECIFIC PLURALISM: A class of logics is specifically pluralis-
tic to the extent that its target concepts include different subcon-
cepts of common generic concepts.
We have it that while M is generically unitarian it is also specifically plural-
istic. Accordingly,
SUBCONCEPT PLURALISM: M exhibits subconcept pluralism
with respect to, say, implication, if and only if implication is one
of its generic concepts, and its different treatments of implication
are treatments of implication in their respectively different subcon-
ceptions.
COROLLARY: Sets of logics exhibiting subconcept pluralism with
respect to their key targets are not in conflict wit one another.
I say again that this would seem to solve M’s incompatibility problem. It
does so in the manner of existential denial. Since the apparently conflicting
sentences of the apparently conflicting systems in M are about different sub-
concepts of some commonly targeted generic concept, the incompatibilities are
only apparent. 19
In a good many approaches, the concept-subconcept arrangement is un-
derstood semantically. When G is a generic concept of which G1, . . . , Gn
are subconcepts, then the term ‘G’ (and its cognates) is n-wise ambiguous as
between the meaning of ‘G’, the meaning of ‘G1’, the meaning of ‘G2’, and so
on. When this happens, we may say that specific senses are tied to generic
senses by a relation of meaning-subsumption. Specific meanings of ‘implies’
imbibe its generic meaning as a necessary but not sufficient condition. This,
too, appears to solve the incompatibility problem. If ‘implies’ is ambiguous
as between ‘implies’1 , ‘implies’2, and so on, then logics making apparently
incompatible provisions for implication are in fact making perfectly compati-
ble provision for different senses of “implies”. Whereupon, we have a further
specimen of pluralism, also of the existential denial sort:
AMBIGUITY PLURALISM (1): M exhibits ambiguity pluralism
with respect to, say, implication if ‘implies’ is n-wise ambiguous
as between the meanings of ‘implies’1, ‘implies’2 . . . ‘implies’n and
the meanings of the ‘implies’i subsume the generic meaning of ‘im-
plies’. COROLLARY: Sets of logics exhibiting ambiguity plural-
ism with regard to its key terms do not conflict with one another.
Our generic unitarianism and the ambiguity version of subconcept plural-
ism are clearly present in some of the pluralisms of the present day, notably
in Beall and Restall (henceforth: B & R). B & R [Beall & Restall 2001, 1] are
unitarians about the generic concept of validity (or equivalently, implication
and consequence):
19. Hartry Field dislikes this solution. He points out that the word ‘electron’ dif-
fers in meaning in the theories of Thomson and Rutherford, but “Rutherford’s theory
disagrees with Thomson’s despite this difference in meaning.” [Field 2009, 345] (em-
phasis added).
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i. An argument is valid when there is no case in which the premises
are true and in which the conclusion is not true. 20
But since they think that there are different species or subconcepts of this
generic one, they are also subconcept pluralists about validity. Moreover,
since they hold that subconcept pluralism arises from the ambiguity of “case”
in the generic definition, their pluralism is of the ambiguity kind.
Do we find this same pluralism in MacColl? There is reason to think that
we do. In his battle with Russell over the place of material “implication” in
logic, MacColl is stoutly unitarian about the generic notion of implication.
ii. ϕ implies ψ if and only if it is in no sense possible both that ϕ
and ∼ ψ. 21
But MacColl is also wholly at home with the idea that there are different sub-
concepts of implication—relevant implication, connexionist implication, many-
valued implication, and so on. 22 There is also reason to think that MacColl
would be drawn to the ambiguity version of subconcept pluralism. Accordingly,
MacColl’s Unitarianism about (deductive) implication can be expressed as fol-
lows:
iii. ϕ implies ψ iff there is some sense of “possible” for which the
conjunction of ϕ and ∼ ψ is not in its extension.
For as R & R rightly observe,
MacColl tried to reflect the distinctions of natural language in his
formal system rather than the other way around, as Frege would.
[Rahman & Redmond 2008, 546]
How could the distinctions between strict, relevant, connexionist and many-
valued implication be present in natural language without it being the case
that “implies” is ambiguous in just those ways?
As easy as it is to find these pluralisms in MacColl, it is at least as difficult
to see them as originating with him. The idea that there are various kinds of
implication containing a common core notion is as old as Aristotle. Aristotle
distinguished between the core notion of necessitation and the particular cases
of syllogistic implication and immediate implication, with still further sub-
divisions looming in the fragmentary work on modal syllogisms. So I don’t
20. Field disputes whether generic implication is in fact captured by (i). This is
an important demurral and a can of worms. Field maintains that as long as (i) is
bound by the seemingly faultless condition that “all cases” in (i) include all actual
cases, then ‘implies’ can’t even be “extensionally captured” by it. It is interesting to
muse about MacColl’s likely reaction to it. But since he didn’t react to it—he wasn’t
aware of the problem—I won’t pursue the matter beyond this point. See [Field 2009,
349–353].
21. Concerning Field’s objection to B & R’s (i), MacColl embraced his (ii) with all
the innocence of B & R’s embracing of their (i). What MacColl would have made of
the objection is anyone’s guess.
22. For certain many-valued systems, it is necessary to recognize an even more
general notion of implication as providing for designated-value preservation.
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yet think that it can be said that we have found a pluralism which MacColl
invented and which forms the basis of his post-1909 neglect.
Different-concept pluralism
Conceptual difference matters for pluralism in ways that range beyond the
generic concepts to which subconcepts are linked. Consider again a point to
which we made fleeting reference in the “Many-one pluralism” section above.
Since the late 1960s there has been a (contested) body of opinion among
modern logicians to the effect that truth conditions on implication cannot serve
as rules of inference or belief revision. 23 Still, whether distinct concepts or just
one, it is widely agreed that logic’s principal targets include implication and
inference. If we turn now to the heated dispute between strict implicationists
and relevantists that livened things up in the 1960s and 70s, we see that if
implication and inference are indeed different concepts, they offer hope for the
dissolution of the stand-off between these two camps. The strategy in question
is Reconciliation. 24 Reconciliation offers warring parties the prospect of win-
win. It offers different things for conflicting intuitions to be true of. In the case
at hand, it proposes that what relevantist intuitions are true of is inference
and what “strictist” intuitions are true of is implication. Ex falso quodlibet is a
case in point. Reconciliation proposes that even if every sentence were indeed
a consequence of a contradiction, it is far from true that every one of those
consequences should actually—or ideally—be drawn. 25
In the present example, conceptual difference performs its conflict-
dissolving role independently of any link to subconcepts. True, there may
be different subconcepts of implication and different concepts of inference, but
these linkages are not what does the work here. Accordingly, we have yet
another breed of existentially denying pluralism.
DIFFERENT-CONCEPT PLURALISM: Systems S and R ex-
hibit different-concept pluralism if and only if C1 and C2 are dif-
ferent target concepts shared by S and R and, with respect to some
claim ϕ over which S and R disagree, ϕ is true when construed
as an S-claim and false when construed as an R-claim, and ∼ ϕ
is true when construed as an R-claim and false when construed as
a S-claim.
AMBIGUITY PLURALISM (2): Ambiguity pluralism (1) gener-
alizes to fit different-concept pluralism.
23. Again, the distinction goes back as far as Aristotle and is implicit in the syl-
logistic by way of the distinction between what a set of premisses necessitates and
what may be syllogistically inferred from them.
24. So-called in my Paradox and Paraconsistency [Woods 2003].
25. See also [Woods 1989].
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A brief reprise
There is reason to think that MacColl is a means-ends instrumentalist both
about the goals of logic and the wherewithal for their fulfillment. He is drawn
to the idea that one of logic’s tasks is to illuminate its own target concepts,
and, correspondingly, to the view that those concepts are a logic’s subject
matter. MacColl is a unitarian about generic concepts such as implication
and possibility, but is a pluralist about their respective subconcepts. He also
holds to the ambiguity version of subconcept pluralism and of the different-
concept pluralism to which it generalizes.
In none of these respects do MacColl’s pluralisms either require or take
expression from any instrumentalism other than the weak and not quite aptly
named thing I’ve been calling means-end instrument. And none of these plu-
ralisms was in any very obvious way invented by MacColl. If RR-theses are to
have a good showing, we’ll have to work harder and dig deeper.
The goose-gander problem
Quine’s quarrel with MacColl is—anachronistically—that since logical-
term pluralism is out of the question (“They don’t know what they are talking
about”), modal, many-valued, relevant, connexionist and probability logics
aren’t logic; and that the right answer to Priest is “One”.
Logical-term unitarianism gives rise to an interesting pair of questions.
Does, as Quine seems to think, logical-term unitarianism imply unitarianism
with regard to logic itself? That is, if the usual run of connectives classically
interpreted are the sole logical terms, does it follow that the classical logic
of propositions, and it only, is the one true propositional logic? The same
question bites in the other direction. Is it possible for one to be a unitarian
about the one true logic and yet a pluralist about the systems’ own logical
terms? These questions give us what we might call the goose-gander problem;
that is, if unitarianism is sauce for the goose of logical systems, how could it
not also be the sauce for the gander of logical particles? It is the problem
of determining whether the one true logic—were there to be such a thing—
precludes or permits non-standard use of its own connectives.
Let us say that there is a negative solution for the goose-gander problem
if and only if both standard and non-standard uses of a system’s connectives
does not expose the system itself to a systems-pluralism. A pair of well-known
cases invoke a negative solution to this problem—Putnam on the relation be-
tween quantum logic and classical connectives, and Dummett on the relation
between intuitionist logic and classical connectives. Seen Putnam’s way, al-
though quantum logic is the one true logic, the classical distributive laws can
be allowed to apply to macro-objects because of the insignificance of super-
positions for them [Putnam 1968]. Similarly, Dummett claims that, although
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intuitionism is the one true logic, there are specific purposes—e.g., matters
of effective decidability—for which classical logic may properly be employed
[Dummett 1978]. In each case, classical logic is said to be a legitimate part of
logic, made so in part by the sublogic relation. 26 Then we have it that:
SUBLOGIC PLURALISM: When the goose-gander problem has a
negative solution with respect to a logic L and its connectives K1,
. . . K2 there exists a sublogic L
∗ of L whose treatment of the Ki
is non-standard by the lights of L.
This would also be a good place to recognize the important idea of applica-
tion pluralism. In the Putnam and Dummett examples, classical uses of the
connectives are justified when they serve particular applications of the home
logic—the description of meso-objects in the first case and the exploration of
effective decidability in the second. By substituting “application” for “treat-
ment” in the indented lines just above, we give this applicational pluralism
official notice.
Before quitting this section, it is well to note that there are conflicts
which sublogic pluralism doesn’t resolve. Especially notable is Putnam’s and
Dummett’s own rivalry about the one true logic, never mind their agreement
about classical logic as their respective sublogics. Complicating the picture is
the selection by Kripke and others of intuitionist logic as a sublogic of classical
logic. 27 Taken in conjunction with Dummett, we would seem to have it that
intuitionist and classical logics are both super and sublogics of one another.
What this suggests is that sublogic pluralism is a conflict-dissolver (if at all)
only in relation to some fixed point. The fixed point is the logic chosen for the
role of superlogic. As we see, not only can the fixed point change, it can do so
in ways that reverse the logic-sublogic relationship of a given arrangement.
My reading of MacColl suggests a greater affinity to applicational pluralism
than to the sublogic pluralisms of Putnam, Dummett, Kripke and the others,
which would have been technically beyond his reach. In light of MacColl’s
conviction that “all symbolic conventions may be altered when convenience
requires it, in order to adapt them to new conditions or to new classes of
problems” [MacColl 1906, 1], which affirms his applicational pluralism, he
might have accepted the sublogic pluralisms exemplified by the cases under
review, had he but known of them. But, again, interesting as it would be to
speculate about the possibility, it is not a question on today’s order paper. So
we will move on.
This leaves the question of a MacCollian nativity. Is there reason to think
that MacColl originated the idea that a logic’s legitimacy is a function of how
it is applied? The answer is No. Applicational relevance has been with us
26. Similar arguments are available for the one and only status of classical logic,
notwithstanding its provisions for stand-alone, purpose-specific non-classical—in fact,
intuitionist—uses of the connectives. Beall and Restall are a case in point [Beall &
Restall 2006, 32 & 72–73].
27. See [Field 2009, 344] who attributes to B & R the attribution of it to Kripke.
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since logic’s founding. Aristotle’s syllogistic again is a case in point. In Topics
and On Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle wants a theory of deduction that
would serve as the theoretical core of a wholly general account of argument, an
account that would help regiment the problematic distinction between good-
looking arguments and good arguments. Syllogisms were purpose-built for
this purpose. Their distinctive properties reflect it, whether the irredundancy
constraint on syllogistic premisses or the non-circularity constraint on syllogis-
tic conclusions. Aristotle also had a logic of immediate implication, the best-
known parts of which are enshrined in the square of opposition. But immediate
implications are no good for argument. For one thing, they are serial question-
beggers. Aristotle was an applicational pluralist about logic—syllogisms are
needed for argumentative contexts, and immediate implications, while they
chart the interaction of quantification and negation, aren’t for Aristotle rules
of argument. 28
The vernacular
A subconcept pluralism is often bound up with a certain philosophical
approach to subconcept individuation. On this view, there are as many sub-
concepts of the concept C as there are in the vernacular different senses of
the term “C” and its cognates. If the word ‘possible’ is n-wise ambiguous then
possibility is a concept of which there are precisely n subconcepts. As we saw,
B & R are generic-concept unitarians about implication and pluralists about
its subconcepts. Moreover, since they hold that subconcept pluralism arises
from the ambiguity of “case” in the generic definition of implication, their plu-
ralism is of the ambiguity kind. What is not clear, to me at least, is whether
the senses of “case” on which the pluralism of B & R turns are required (or
assumed) to be ambiguities in the vernacular. If so, the ambiguities they at-
tribute to “case”, in virtue of which “valid”, and “implies” and “consequence”
in turn are ambiguous, are ambiguities present in English Today, as Paul Ziff
once called it.
The vernacular question is critical for the blindness problem. Let’s revisit
M,M′ andM′′. Are there as many senses of ‘possible’ or of ‘implies’ as there
are irredundant members of M or the vastly greater number in M′ and M′′?
Are “possible” and ‘implies’ more than 50-wise ambiguous in English? One
would hardly think so. Accordingly, if the ambiguity version of subconcept
pluralism is true and if vernacularism is given its head, most of the logics in
M, M′ and M′′ are blind. And, if this is so, the incompatibility problem
is correspondingly solved, but only by default and not in any intellectually
satisfying way. For if blind logics don’t say anything, it is trivial that they
28. Not to overlook that Frege’s and Russell’s own logics were purpose-built to
implement a particular thesis from the philosophy of mathematics. These logics were
the hand-maidens of logicism.
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don’t say anything incompatible with each other. And, if this is the case,
existential denial fails for blindness and succeeds for incompatibility only on a
technicality. Given his own vernacularism, MacColl would have rejected most
of present-day modal logic. There aren’t nearly enough different senses in
English Today to service modal logic’s unseemly sprawl.
MacColl’s vernacularism? Yes, let’s not forget that MacColl “tried to re-
flect the distinctions of natural language in his formal system, rather than
the other way around, as Frege would”. This is nowhere more evident than
MacColl’s dispute with Russell over the conditionality of ‘⊃’. As R & R
point out,
MacColl’s central notion is that of the conditional. He not only
acknowledges that this connective holds a privileged place in his
logic, he also makes the conditional the center of his philosophy.
[Rahman & Redmond 2008, 545]
MacColl himself writes:
For nearly thirty years I have been trying in vain to convince
[Russell et. al.] that this assumed invariable equivalence between
a conditional (or implication [SIC]) and a disjunctive is an error.
[. . . ] Thus, Mr. Russell, arguing correctly from the customary con-
vention of logicians, arrives at the strange conclusion that (among
Englishmen) we may conclude from a man’s red hair that he is
a doctor, or from his being a doctor that (whatever appearances
may say to the contrary) his hair is red. [MacColl 1908, 152]
MacColl’s position is that there is no sense of “if . . . then” in any natural
language for which “If he has red hair then he is a doctor” is a true conditional
sentence. Right or wrong, this puts him squarely in the vernacularist camp. 29
In our consideration of it up to now, conflict-resolution pluralism can claim
the attraction of win-win settlement. But when it comes to the real nature
of implication, there is nothing win-win about MacColl’s solution. It is a
zero-sum resolution, with the strict-implication analysis the big winner and
the material-“implication” analysis the loser hands down. So, on this ques-
tion, MacColl’s resolution strategy is an application of what, in Paradox and
Paraconsistency [Woods 2003], I call Surrender. Surrender, which is exem-
plified by reductio arguments and Aristotle’s and Locke’s ad hominem refu-
tations, 30 is the psychological opposite of Reconciliation. It is a means not
29. Their further dispute concerns the necessity or otherwise of having in one’s
object language a genuine conditional-expressing connective such that whenever ϕ
implies ψ, there is a true object-language sentence whose conditionality is expressed
by that connective with ϕ as antecedent and ψ as consequent. Since MacColl thought
that ‘⊃’ wasn’t such a connective, he also thought the one-to-one correspondence claim
was moot.
30. For Aristotle, see On Sophistical Refutations, 22, 178b 17, 170a 13, 17–18, 20,
177b 33–34, 183a 22, 24; Topics ϕ 11, 161a 21; and Metaphysics. For Locke, see
the chapter “Of reasoning” in [Locke 1961]. Note that ad hominem manoeuvres in
Aristotle’s and Locke’s sense are not fallacies.
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of saving your opponent’s face, but rather of beating him into submission.
Nothing pluralist here. 31
The vernacularity issue puts a good deal of pressure on the following ques-
tion: If a term ‘C’ is n-wise ambiguous, where are those n-different senses to
be found? Vernacularists are drawn to a predictable answer. If ‘C’ is n-wise
ambiguous in L, then these various senses of ‘C’ will be present in the linguis-
tic practice of competent users of L. So, if “implies” is ambiguous in English,
all its senses will be located in English Today.
It takes little effort to see that vernacularism is a spoke in the wheels of
modern logic. True, some of logic’s most abiding targets are concepts anchored
to meanings fixed by the usages of English Today. Even so, aren’t these
meanings the products of language use, and isn’t language use subject to
change? Isn’t what things mean in English subject to the linguistic conventions
of English? And aren’t conventions solutions to coordination problems? Don’t
they settle what, in uttering an expression, its utterer should be understood
as meaning? If the meanings of English as we have it just now are too few to
generate the concepts constituting the multiple subject matters required by
our sprawling logics, couldn’t we hurry things along? Couldn’t we adopt new
conventions? Couldn’t we make new meanings?
Suppose that we could. Then we would have as many concepts for logic to
pronounce upon as it is possible for us to make meanings for. And this would
give us made-meaning pluralism.
Making meaning
Of its several forms, conventionalism is the only form of instrumentalism
which is philosophically interesting in its own right and convincingly linked to
a like pluralism. Whether it can be attributed to MacColl is another matter
to which I shall return two sections hence. Before attending to it head-on, I
want first to say something about this business of hurrying things along, that
is, making new meanings to suit one’s logical convenience. In so doing, it is
helpful to mark a distinction between a system’s conceptual adequacy and its
31. It is important to note that both Reconciliation and Surrender are negotiation
tools, and like all negotiation tools are consensual in nature. For Reconciliation to
work, both parties to the conflict have to agree about what their respective positions
are true (and false) of. Some relevantists do not agree that what relevant logic is false
of is implication, and some strictists do not agree that what relevant logic is true of
is inference. Similarly, for an Aristotelian or Lockean refutation to work, the refuted
party has to agree that his position does genuinely conflict with other commitments
he is not prepared to give up. There are situations in which such agreements are
impossible to get. One person’s reduction of an absurd proposition can equally be
another person’s sound demonstration of a surprising (even shocking) truth. This
presents negotiators with what in [Woods 2003] I called Philosophy’s most difficult
problem.
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mathematical virtuosity, which, in turn, is presaged by an earlier distinction of
Kant. I’ll deal with mathematical virtuosity in this section and the Kantian
contrast in the section after.
Mathematical virtuosity is tied up with what I once heard Joke Meheus call
a “decent” logic. 32 One way in which to achieve this decency is to have a logic
with a recursively specifiable formal grammar, a suitably rigorous proof the-
ory, an appropriately set-theoretic semantics, and the demonstrable presence
or absence of metatheoretical properties such as consistency, completeness,
soundness, and decidability. 33 Also important is that the syntax of the logic
should be able to regulate the flow of its proof procedures, and that its syntax
and semantics also be structured to admit of metaproofs that employ the var-
ious forms of mathematical induction. Recurring to M, no one doubts that
all its members are decent. 34
It would be hard to overestimate the importance of mathematical virtuosity
in modern logic. There are people for whom decency is logic’s be-all and end-
all. If that were so, then the right kind of multiplicity for logic would be as
many or as few as meet the requirement of decency. A less triumphalist posture
cuts that claim in half; that is, to say it makes of decency a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition of logic’s tolerable size. For suppose it were otherwise.
Then the force of eliminating the decency requirement would—let me put this
without delicacy—leave it open that some of our logics could be just any old
rigged-up formalism. Without prior constraint, a debauchery would ensue, in
which Anything Goes in logic. 35 As it happens, not anything a woebegone
scribbler scratches together counts as a system of logic, never mind the formal
purity of his intentions. In days not long gone, some of the worst old duffers
of the Soviet Academy were self-announced dialectic logicians. But it is not
going too far to say that they weren’t in any sense relevant to our present
concerns logicians at all. Suppose it were otherwise. Then there would be a
bona fide notion of implication—for breezy ease of reference call it Stalinist
implication—which these hacks got exactly right. 36 Generalizing, what we get
when we suppress the decency requirement is the Jazz Age in logic, the no-
holds-barred tumble of Anything Goes. If anything is certain about MacColl’s
own pluralism, it is that it is not the Anything Goes variety.
It is interesting to reflect on the extent to which MacColl himself may
have been drawn to the decency requirement. Whatever their respective dif-
ferences, decent logics are nice pieces of mathematics. What is distinctive
32. At the session on ‘Abduction’ at the Cognitive Science Society Conference in
Chicago in July, 2004.
33. Others, of course, are less impressed by completeness than by categoricity. But
the basic idea remains the same.
34. Not always with ease. Getting a semantics for S1 was particularly brutal.
35. With thanks to [Stove 1996]. See Cole Porter, “Anything Goes” (Copyright
1934 WB Music Corp).
36. Of course, as some wags have it, dialetheic implication is Stalinist implication.
But that’s a light-heartedly intended in-joke about Priest’s politics, not his logic.
MacColl’s elusive pluralism 223
about the newly emerging logics of MacColl’s time was not so much the range
of their subject matters—modal, relevantist, connexionist, many-valued, and
so on—but rather the expectation that the analyses of those subject mat-
ters would be given mathematically adequate formulations. This gives mod-
ern logic two masters to serve: the course of conceptual adequacy—of get-
ting, say, the concept of implication right—and the cause of mathematical
adequacy—of producing the system’s theorems decently. MacColl had reser-
vations about the mathematization of logic, as witness the epigraph at the
head of this paper. He was not much taken with reductions of logic to al-
gebra, by the idea that logic had a mathematical subject matter. Although
he himself was influenced by the algebraist methods of the day, he favoured
a propositional rather than an algebraic approach, in the interests of “pure
logic”. In the epigraph, MacColl counsels against warfare between the logicians
(he means philosophically-minded logicians) and mathematicians about the
form that a successful rapprochement might take. In “Symbolic logic” (1880)
he gives a hint:
Symbolic reasoning may be said to have pretty much the same
relation to ordinary reasoning that machine-labour has to manual
labour. [MacColl 1880, 45]
MacColl goes on to say that the right kind of formalism enables
any ordinary mind to obtain by simple mechanical processes re-
sults which would be beyond the reason of the strongest intellect
if left entirely to its own resources. [MacColl 1880, 45]
I take this to mean that a well-behaved logic is one whose procedures are
mathematical in a methodological and abstract sense. This is the way in
which “mechanical processes” are made possible. But what is neither necessary
nor desirable in logic is that it be endowed with an expressly mathematical
subject matter.
Analysis and synthesis
Vernacularism requires that the usages that generate the concepts which
serve as the subject matter of a logic have a prior presence in natural language.
There is a significant tradition in philosophy which regards the vernacularist
stance as a parochialism to no good end. This is where Kant enters the picture.
Throughout his philosophical life Kant advanced a distinction between
analysis and synthesis. 37 Analysis, says Kant, is the business of making our
concepts clear. Synthesis is the business of making clear concepts. Analysis is
the business of philosophers. Synthesis is the business of mathematicians. A
37. Early is Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of Principles of Natural
Philosophy and Morality, and Logic, (1704) [Kant 1974a]. Late is Logic (1800) [Kant
1974b].
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similar distinction is invoked, with attribution to Moore rather than Kant, by
Russell in his Principles of Mathematics. It is the distinction between philo-
sophical analysis and mathematical definition, which latter “is widely different
from that current among philosophers” [Russell 1903, 15]. Russell writes:
It is necessary to realize that definition, in mathematics, does not
mean, as in philosophy, an analysis of the idea to be defined into
constituent ideas. This notion, in any case, is only applicable to
concepts, whereas in mathematics it is possible to define terms
which are not concepts. [Russell 1903, 27] 38
Mathematics is the business of making clear concepts. What would we want
clear concepts for if not for an interest in the things they instantiate and the
things they make true. Making up concepts is a way of making things true.
It is a heady idea—making things true. Theories, says Quine are free for
the making up, echoing Eddington’s crack that they are put-up jobs. Is this
really true? What is the source of this creative potency? And what, if any,
are its limits?
The distinction between analysis and synthesis in logic also gives us the
attractive means to re-engage the distinction between a logic’s mathematical
adequacy and its conceptual adequacy, and to do so in a way that sheds
light on logic’s contemporary pluralism and on the further consequences it
holds for the vernacularity thesis. According to the synthesis part of the
present distinction, it is possible for a logical system to generate new concepts.
When the system is merely decent—that is, when it is merely mathematically
adequate—the concepts it innovates are nevertheless bona fide concepts of
logic. If this is right, then the vernacularity thesis is wrong. It is wrong because
mathematically adequate systems originate concepts that have no presence
in English Today. And, mark well, this now provides that mathematically
adequate logics meet the conceptual adequacy condition as a matter of course.
For how could they not be faithful to the very concepts their theorems create?
38. There is a point on which Kant and Russell appear to be at odds. Kant thinks
that it is possible to make concepts up. Russell thinks that it is possible to innovate
definitions which, had they defined concepts, would have been made-up concepts.
Russell is driven to this rather striking hesitation by having embraced the Moorean
folly that since the intuitive logic of classes is inconsistent, there simply is no concept
of class, leading Russell to say “I have failed to perceive any concept fulfilling the
[post-paradox] conditions required for the notion of class” [Russell 1903, v–vi]. This
is not a matter on which anything of deep importance for our purposes hangs. So I
shall simply pass it by. Whether Kant is right in thinking that concepts are free for
the making or Russell is right in thinking that there are mathematical definitions free
for the making, the fact remains that for both men, these inventions are entirely legit-
imate in mathematics, that they are the source of genuinely principled descriptions,
some of which are provably valid.
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Rainy-day pluralism
The present idea is that mathematical adequacy is a sufficient condi-
tion of synthetic content, hence guarantor of its possessor’s conceptual ad-
equacy. No mathematically adequate logic is blind. Of course, if mathemat-
ical adequacy solves the blindness problem, it does not, just so, solve the
application problem. If synthesis is given its head, mathematical adequacy
gives conceptual adequacy, but it does not guarantee applicational adequacy.
Consider an example.
Dialetheic logic. About seven logicians in the wide world think—I mean,
really think—that there are true contradictions. Yet true contradictions are
the whole motivation for dialetheic logic. It is a logic (a family of logics)
that caters for a highly selective set of true contradictions. Nearly everyone
thinks that the very idea of a true contradiction is nonsense, that there is
no conceivable sense of “true” and no conceivable sense of “contradiction” for
which any contradiction is true. But this is wrong. Since approximately 1979,
the year in which Priest’s LP début’d, dialetheism has been a mainstream
research programme in logic. Its papers appear in the leading journals and
its monographs appear with the best university presses. Why would this be
so? The answer is that the dialetheic systems of the present day are decent
logics. They are accomplished pieces of abstract mathematics. They have good
generative grammars, rigorous and complete proof methods, mathematically
lucid set-theoretic semantics, and they permit principled discernment of the
presence or absence of the usual run of metalogical properties—consistency,
soundness and so on. And withal it builds yet another concept of implication,
and another conception of logical truth.
The moral to draw from the dialetheic project parallels is that in logic,
as in mathematics, mathematical versatility suffices for synthetic conceptual
adequacy, without guaranteeing a concomitant applicational adequacy. Prior
to Riemann there was no sense in which space was bent. Prior to dialetheic
logic there was no sense in which contradictions are true. But for anyone
who accepts the role of Kantian syntheses in logic, after dialetheism there
is a concept of true contradictions and interesting attempts to find fruitful
applications for it. 39
We have been assuming throughout that multiple systems of logic are
to be tolerated to the extent to which they are both mathematically and
conceptually adequate. Of late we have taken note of a difference in practice—
if not always an expressly voiced one—between vernacularity and syntheticity
interpretations of what conceptual adequacy requires. What we have not yet
determined is whether a third condition should be imposed—the requirement
of applicational adequacy in the here and now. If actual practice is anything
to go on, the answer to this question is emphatically in the negative. Imagine
39. Most notably, a revival of intuitive set theory and intuitive semantics, contra-
dictions and all. For a brief interim progress report see [Woods 2003, 169–174].
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that one of your students comes to you asking: “What is the road to a solid
career in logic?” The answer, for good or ill, is: “Let your constructions be
graced with mathematical versatility.” Bearing on this is a remark of Johan
van Benthem’s:
Now that we all understand the virtues of a model-theoretic se-
mantics satisfying general Montagovian standards of rigor and
clarity there is joy in playing around with virtually every specific
detail of Montague’s original paradigm. The following [. . . ] illus-
trate various aspects of this new wave of free speculation. [Van
Benthem 1979, 337] 40
On the face of it, this is disturbing—the triumph of homo ludens over homo
sapiens. But that’s not the way it plays in logic’s present-day pluralism. Not
only can playful logics produce new concepts whose existence owes nothing to
their applicational fruitfulness, but—as the Riemann example reminds us—
whose present want of applicability can be tomorrow’s applicational triumph.
This gives rise to a further species of pluralism. Let us call it rainy-day
pluralism. 41 Rainy-day pluralism is the pluralism of inventories of conceptu-
ally innovative unapplied logics awaiting the possibility of future employment.
They are systems of logic put away for a rainy day, as the expression goes.
They are the proceeds of logical investigation at its most abstractly experi-
mental. 42 It is a pluralism that relieves logic of the necessity of capturing
pre-ordained, pre-existing concepts, and gives to logic free hand at making
new ones up, ready for application if such there be, but worthy objects of our
attention all the same, as nice pieces of abstract mathematics. Modern logic
is wedded to the idea of making things up. Not everything is fair game, but if
your formal apparatus is decent, if your creative efforts are crowned with the
requisite mathematical virtuosity, you have a remarkably free hand.
Instrumentalism
We come at last to MacColl’s instrumentalism. It is an instrumentalism
characterized by R & R as a kind of conventionalism. They say that:
40. Emphases added.
41. It is well to note that, for all its considerable latitude, rainy-day pluralism is
not Anything Goes pluralism. Not anything goes in rainy-day pluralism. Rainy-day
logics must meet the tough standards of mathematical virtuosity. Rainy-day logics
have to be decent.
42. Of course, historical accuracy requires that we note that in its early days,
modern dialetheic logic was never thought of as an applicationless plaything built for
the shelf of logics in waiting. From the outset, dialetheic logicians had clear targets
in mind. There were true contradictions awaiting them pre-theoretically. Their job,
as they saw it, was to produce a logic that would accommodate that fact. However
from the point of view of virtually everyone else, since there is no pre-existing datum
for dialetheic logic, the only virtues it can have—and does in fact have so far—are
the virtues of mathematical virtuosity.
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MacColl was probably the first to extend conventionalism and
instrumentalism to logic. [Rahman & Redmond 2008, 534]
MacColl himself also speaks of conventions in logic:
[A]ll symbolic conventions may be altered when convenience re-
quires it, in order to adapt them to new conditions or to new
classes of problems. [MacColl 1906, 1]
Both these ideas have generated large and important literatures. It would
not be far wrong to say that instrumentalism and conventionalism are the
dominant themes in 20th century philosophy of science, in forms ranging from
theoretical terms and sentences, nominal definitions, theoretical models, ideal-
izations, abstractions and fictions. These practices raise two obvious questions,
one of which conventionalism purports to answer and the second of which is
the draw for instrumentalism. The first question is, “How are these structures
wrought?” The second question is, “What are they good for?”
To the extent possible, I want not to entangle myself in their formidable
complexities. I want to know whether MacColl is a conventionalist, and I
want to know whether, if he is, this has played a role in his neglect. To make
this as light a burden as possible, I want to try to find a minimal condition
on conventionalism, and then to determine whether MacColl satisfies it. If he
does, there is more work to do. If he doesn’t, our work is fortunately at an end.
In this spirit, I will take it as given that any form of conventionalism which we
could even consider ascribing to MacColl must include the Kantian principle
of concept-making. Poincaré’s own conventionalism—of which MacColl would
have been aware—is preceded by Kant’s doctrine of concept-making and would
hardly have been possible without it [Poincaré 1905]. In so saying, I don’t want
to make too much of Kant’s presence here. It is not in the least necessary to be
a Kantian to accept that meanings can be made. For our purposes, Russell’s
principle of mathematical definism would do just as well.
THE CONVENTIONALIST MINIMUM: A theory is convention-
alist only if some of its ineliminable findings are of the theorist’s
making.
COROLLARY: If a conventionalist theory’s subject-matter is fur-
nished by its target concepts, at least some of these are of the
theorist’s making, hence are internal to the theory.
It is well to emphasize how little of conventionalism the conventionalist mini-
mum captures. It offers us little more than a shot in the dark. If, perchance,
MacColl rejects the principle, then he is no conventionalist, never mind the
forms his pluralism might take. Acceptance is another thing altogether. It
leaves the issue of MacColl’s conventionalism wide-open and unresolved. So
which is it to be? Can we plausibly pin this conventionalist minimum on
MacColl? Upon reflection, and on balance, I think that we cannot. There are
three main considerations that should give us pause. One is MacColl’s ver-
nacularism, his conviction that logic’s rightful conceptual targets have a prior
presence in the vernacular, hence are external to the theory. Another is his
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hesitation over the out-and-out mathematicization of logic, a hesitation which,
whatever its details, would certainly have called into question the very idea
of mathematical adequacy as guarantor of conceptual legitimacy. The third is
unitarian obduracy about generic implication and conditionality. Since there
is no sense—vernacular or otherwise—in which ‘⊃’ expresses a conditional,
there is no sense—vernacular or otherwise—in which if ϕ ⊃ ψ then if ϕ then
ψ. 43 Equally, since there is no sense of implies—vernacular or otherwise—in
which, for example, arbitrary pairs of falsehoods imply one another.
Not only was MacColl not the adapter of this conventionalism to his logic,
it would have been an idea to invite his hostility.
Neglect
MacColl was plurally pluralist—different-concept, subconcept, ambiguity
and vernacularist. Of none of these was he the inventor, and—with the ex-
ception of his vernacularism—none would have earned the scorn of his post-
1909 contemporaries, notwithstanding the various other things they disagreed
about. Similarly, while made-meaning pluralism is grist for the mill of con-
ventionalism, it is not a pluralism MacColl would have been happy with; and
yet without it, it is difficult to see how we could get him to satisfy even our
minimal conventionalism.
What, then, explains MacColl’s neglect? Why did his contemporaries and
correspondents stop writing about him? The first and almost last answer is
that he died. The default position in logic, as in the rest of life, is post-
mortem neglect. Beyond that, MacColl lacked an academic position and
a cosmopolitan habitat. MacColl worked on logic in fits and starts. His
writing is confused and his technical skills were limited. Maybe in large
part it was just dumb luck (Why does everyone read Quine’s “Two dog-
mas” and no one Morton White’s “Analytic-synthetic: an untenable dualism”?
Why did everyone read Strawson’s “On referring” and hardly anyone Geach’s
“Subject and predicate”?).
I have heard it said that the principal reason for MacColl’s neglect was his
outrageous prodigality with ontological commitment, his brazen subscription
to existence-neutral quantification. Should we make something of this?
Meinong was similarly minded. Not a logician, Meinong was a psychologi-
cally trained philosopher drawn to the problem of intentionality. To that end,
he contrived a theory of objects which was tailor-made for the kind of interest
MacColl exhibited in pluralistic Universes of Discourse, within which he distin-
guishes the class e of existent items and the class 0 of non-existents—objects
such as centaurs and round squares [MacColl 1906, 1–4]. 44 It is interesting
43. And a jolly good thing, too. Even MacColl would allow that if (if ϕ then ψ)
then ϕ ⊃ ψ. But if we also put it that if ϕ ⊃ ψ then if ϕ then ψ, we have the
equivalence of ‘⊃’ and “if . . . then”. Rather embarrassing that!
44. MacColl referred to 0 as the “null class”. However, by this he didn’t mean
that 0 was empty, but only that its members were objects that didn’t exist. When
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that Russell in an appendix of Principles of Mathematics took after Meinong
with a certain vigour. Although Russell didn’t like what Meinong had to say
about these matters, an appendix in a major work can hardly be called ne-
glect. Russell seems not to have danced a like attention on the similar views of
MacColl. If this is neglect, it is not the existence-free character of MacColl’s
logic that occasioned it. When it comes to objects, MacColl is Hamlet to
Russell’s Horatio. “There are more things in heaven than are dreamed of in
your logic, Russell.” MacColl’s existence-free logic is countable as yet another
logic to throw into the mix, along with all the other existentially loaded ones,
but not in ways that swell the ranks of systems-pluralism to any great extent.
By far the greater part of MacColl’s impact on pluralism is in the size of logic’s
ontology. But since this is not the pluralism that currently occupies us, I shall
let it be. 45
I confess that I am bested by the neglect question. Most logicians come and
go without creating the slightest occasion for neglect. Neglect implies prior
recognition, and it is no small feat to have been noticed by the likes of Russell,
Peirce and Schröder. If eventual neglect is the cost of such recognition, it is a
price most of my friends would cheerfully pay. MacColl was in a very different
class. The heavy hitters of the day paid attention to him, although none was
his champion in the way that Russell was of Frege.
Then he died and was forgotten. That’s the way it goes.
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